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ABSTRACT
This paper uses the Indian tariﬀ reforms of the early nineties to estimate how households re-
sponded to the negative income shocks caused by the tariﬀ decreases. Households more hurt
by the tariﬀ reform decreased overall expenditure, but the response is not uniform across food
items. In particular, households more hurt by the reform did not change their consumption of
cereals, but decreased their consumption of all other food items. Although this coping mech-
anism helped maintain overall levels of calorie consumption, diet diversity and the associated
beneﬁts were sacriﬁced.
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Despite rapid economic progress and reduced incidence of poverty since the early 1990s,
India continues to encompass the largest share of the world's poor and food-insecure population,
typically dened as individuals consuming less than 2100 calories daily. In the past two decades
the country has enacted a number of policies, including a dramatic trade liberalization, that in
part aim to reduce the incidence of both poverty and food insecurity. This study focuses on
how households employed in industries exposed to large tari decreases cope with the negative
income shocks caused by the increased import competition.
There are a variety of coping mechanisms households employ to weather economic shocks,
which include accessing credit markets and selling o assets.1 Studies also describe dierences
between poor and rich households in the composition of diets and dierences in the intra-
household allocation of calories (e.g., Oldewage-Theron and Dicks 2006). Here, changes to both
the number of overall calories consumed as well as the composition of those calories in response
to a negative income shock are analyzed.
The Indian tari reform of the early nineties, implemented in response to a severe balance-of-
payments crisis and under the advice of the IMF, represents an excellent opportunity to analyze
the resulting change to food insecurity. Rather than targeting tari decreases at industries that
were trending dierently, the vast majority of the unexpected change resulted from the reduction
of the maximum tari rate and the normalization of all taris to one of ve levels between 1991
and 2004. Furthermore, although the tari reform was just one portion of a large number of
structural reforms, larger tari decreases were not aimed more or less at other industries that
were targeted for other reforms. Thus, this setting reduces the chances that the resulting change
to food security assessments will be the result of unrelated industrial or consumption trends.
In order to identify consumption of those most hurt, regional dierences in pre-reform em-
ployment are exploited. Specically, regions where pre-reform employment was exposed to large
tari decreases are compared to regions where pre-reform employment was exposed to much
smaller tari decreases. Previous studies have demonstrated that workers in industries suddenly
exposed to the resulting import competition did in fact economically suer. Rural poverty de-
creased by less in regions exposed to the largest tari decreases (Topalova 2007), and there is
indirect evidence that underemployment decreased less in those same regions (Edmonds et al.
1For surveys of this literature, see Payne and Lipton (1994) and Barrett (2002).
12009).
In the main empirical nding, regions more hurt by the tari reform did observe a decrease
in overall expenditure- the average regional exposure to the tari reform caused a 4.9 percent
decrease in a household's per capita expenditure. Although overall expenditure decreased, the
expenditure on individual food items did not uniformly decrease. Households hurt by the reform
did not reduce cereals expenditure, but decreased expenditure of all other food categories (e.g.,
dairy, meat, vegetables, etc.). This substitution away from more expensive calories allowed
households to better cope with the income shock, and resulted in no statistically signicant
relationship between the negative income shocks of the trade reform and the numbers of food-
insecure households.
We draw two primary conclusions from these results. First, the substitution of households
hurt by a negative income shock towards a less diversied diet that is more reliant on cereals could
help to explain the poor nutritional outcomes in the country amongst the poorest households,
many of which consume over 2100 total calories. This includes not only high rates of acute
malnutrition, but also the possibility of increased incidence of many other poor health outcomes
later in life (e.g., Drescher et al 2007).2
Second, these estimates help illuminate the potential short to medium-run impacts trade
reforms have on food security. Although many policy makers and researchers advocate more
trade openness as a means to increase income and improve food security in the long run (e.g.,
von Braun et al 1992), studies have repeatedly shown that these policies involve both structural
adjustment costs in the short to medium run as well as a subset of the population that is worse
o in the long run (e.g., Jones and Neary 1995). These estimates suggest that households in
India are able to eectively cope with these adjustment costs in order to maintain a minimum
level of calorie consumption, but the composition of those calories change as a result. Thus,
food assistance programs that better promote diet diversity might be able to help mitigate these
costs in the short to medium run.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes both the tari and concur-
rent reforms in India; Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and evidence of how the tari
reform aected household consumption; and Section 5 concludes.
Section 2.1: The Indian Structural Reforms
2Estimates of malnutrition are available at a World Health Organization database accessed at
http://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/database/countries/en/ January 2011.
2The Indian structural reforms began in July of 1991. With the Industrial Policy Statement,
the government liberalized FDI in certain industries, abolished most oversight and licensing
laws, and substantially changed laws governing the public sector. In addition to the changes in
industrial policies, there were changes in both the quantitative and price restrictions hampering
external trade. Taris were dramatically reduced and the negative list, which accounted for the
bulk of the quantitative trade restrictions, was also signicantly dismantled. The reforms con-
tinued throughout the next decade, where taris were further reduced, and nearly all industries
were eventually opened to FDI without approval and taken o the negative list; the public sector
and licensing reforms varied slightly, but almost all the changes were those made initially.
A large and growing literature has evolved describing the strong eects these reforms have
had on the economy. Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy (2003) nd that the trade reforms led
to an increase in labor-demand elasticities; Aghion et al (2008) describe how licensing reforms
had a larger positive eect on rm productivity in states with more exible labor laws; and
Topalova (2007) and Edmonds et al (2007) respectively nd that the regions where employment
was more aected by the tari decreases had smaller decreases in poverty and smaller increases
in school enrollment for children. All of these studies suggest that over dierent time horizons,
each aspect of the structural reforms had a strong eect on the economy.
Despite the comprehensive nature of the reforms, there are reasons to expect that the FDI,
Licensing, and Public sector reforms might not have had as strong or as immediate of an impact
as expected. The eects of these reforms critically depend on new entrants into local markets.
However, removing restrictions imposed by the Central government did not suddenly create free
entry, as discussed at length by Sinha (1998). Demonstrating the power wielded by the state,
in response to a question about obtaining a license from the central government, an investor
responded \Licenses? It was a hurdle. But it was as if we had ten hurdles to cross, and the license
amounted to only two... The other hurdles were in the states: land, approval for electricity, raw
materials, pollution controls, and labor regulations. So today [after liberalization] we have the
same problem."3
On the other hand, tari decreases increased competition from producers outside the purview
of state governments, and might be more likely to have an immediate impact on the economy.
The bulk of the tari changes were the result of a readily apparent selection criteria: taris
above a peak rate were brought down to a declining peak tari rate over time and eventually
3Quote was taken from Sinha (1998).
3all taris were normalized to one of ve rates. Beginning in 1992, any tari above 150% was
reduced to that level. In subsequent years the peak rate was reduced to 110%, 85%, 65%, and so
forth. Combining the fact that relative tari levels appear to largely be the result of industrial
policies dating back to the early 1950s (Panagaryia 2006), this structure minimizes the chances
that the resulting political response to the tari reform was the result of politicians picking
industries that were trending dierently prior to the reform.
In addition to these changes, there were a small handful of cases where the government indi-
vidually targeted industries for tari changes for troubling reasons. For example, in speeches to
parliament, the various nance ministers have prefaced the announcement of these small number
of tari changes with statements such as \There has been a persistent complaint from industry,"
or \Our electronics industry has become of age"(Mishra 1996). However, these types of tari
changes accounted for a very small share of the total reform. This point is demonstrated in
Figure 1, which graphs the average tari rate of both the true tari series and a hypotheti-
cal tari series created by ignoring these individually targeted tari changes. Specically, the
downward-moving peak is applied to the pre-reform tari rates. The two series are remarkably
similar, and only start to slightly diverge later in the reform period as the peak tari changes
become smaller and the individually targeted changes start to make up a larger share of the
total reform.
In order to attribute changes in consumption to the trade reform, we need to verify that tari
decreases for particular industries did not coincid with other reforms and were not correlated
with other industrial trends. Corroborating the general lack of political manipulation in the
tari reform, initial tari changes between 1991 and 1996 and tari changes between 1991 and
2004 are regressed on trends in employment shares prior to 1991 and politically sensitive worker
characteristics. These include measures of skill intensity, wages, household characteristics, etc.4
If politicians were aiming reforms at the least politically sensitive industries one might expect
the aected industries to be correlated with determinants of political aliation, where previous
studies have noted that urban, higher skilled, and wealthier individuals tend to support the right-
wing political party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Sthanumoorthy and Eapen 2004, Yadav
2004). Displaying the results in Table 1, there is very little evidence of a correlation between the
tari changes and observable worker characteristics; a joint test of signicance yields p-values
of .90 and .41 respectively in the two specications.
4These variables were taken from pre-reform NSS Consumer Expenditure and Employment & Unemployment
surveys. Reform data was acquired from publications by the responsible Indian government ministries.
4On the other hand, in order to separate the eects of the tari reforms from the other
reforms, it is also important to verify that the tari reform was not targeted at the same
industries experiencing other reforms. Table 2 presents results from regressing the tari change
aimed at each industry in each time period on an indicator for whether the reform experienced
each of the other types of reforms- fdi, licensing, public sector, and quantitative restrictions on
imports. The results suggest that the tari reform was uncorrelated with other reforms. None
of the estimated coecients are statistically signicant, and in column (5), the p-value on a test
of all coecients jointly equaling zero is .500.
Section 3.1: Tari Liberalization and Food Security
Rather than focus on more complete denitions of food security which focus on the prob-
ability of having enough food in the current as well as future periods (e.g., Barrett 2002),
this analysis is forced to focus on the observed consumption responses to the negative income
shocks caused by the trade reforms. In particular, this analysis focuses on the total amount of
consumption as well as changes in consumption of particular food items.
In order to identify the response of those harmed, this study follows Topalova (2007) and
Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2007) in constructing a metric correlated with the magnitude
of economic losses from the reform. As mentioned in the introduction, this metric identies
regions where the primary pre-reform employer was exposed to large tari decreases. Specically,
using i to denote industry and r to denote region, short run employment costs associated with





where Eir denotes total pre-reform employment, Tarit denotes the tari level, and Popr is the
pre-reform population.5 Thus, employment in a region was more exposed to the tari decreases
if this measure was more positive.
These studies both present evidence that increased import competition, as measured through
a smaller TarExposure, leads to a larger share of the population harmed by the tari reform.
Specically, a more negative value is consistent with lower prices of imported goods forcing
rms to leave the market, which causes newly unemployed workers to join the reservation pool
5The primary dierence between this measure and the ones used in Topalova (2007) and Edmonds, Pavcnik,
and Topalova (2007) is that this measure uses both rural and urban employment. Results do not change when
only using rural employment in the construction of TarExposure and restricting the analysis to rural households.
5of agriculture labor. This subsequently puts downward pressure on the local reservation wage
(Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova 2007). Further verifying that these regions in fact have a
higher share of voters economically harmed by the reform, Topalova (2007) demonstrates that
regions facing increased import competition observe smaller decreases in poverty relative to
other regions.
The following reduced form specication is estimated:
(1) Consumprth = r + t + TarExposurert + Xrth + rth
where Consumprth and denotes the expenditure of household h in district r and time t; r
and t denote regional and time xed eects; and Xrth contains control variables for individual
households.6 Time xed eects absorb economic shocks aecting the entire country; district
xed eects more fully absorb time-invariant district heterogeneity. Specications are estimated
which analyze total household consumption, and consumption of particular food and non-food
items. Estimates of  identify the consumption response of households hurt by the reform. An
estimate of  > 0 indicate that households hurt by tari decreased their consumption.
There are a few things worth noting about this formulation. First, although the tari reforms
appeared to be uncorrelated with observable industrial characteristics, it is important to make
sure that the small number of individually selected tari changes are not driving the results. In
this regard, TarExposure is constructed using the hypothetical tari series based only on the
application of peak tari rate decreases described in Section 2.1.
Second, this specication will not be able to determine whether consumption decreased in
total in response to the reform. There are a number of other possible gains and losses from
the tari reform that are absorbed by the various xed eects and controls. These estimates
simply allow us to compare the consumption changes in response to one particular aspect of the
reform. Lastly, there were a large number of reforms that could both help and hurt households
that are captured in the set of controls. Thus any estimation focusing on one portion needs to
demonstrate the omission of the other aspects of the reform do not aect the results.
6Controls varying with time include an indicator of whether a household belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Tribe,
the amount of land possessed, and household size. Additionally, the controls contain a number of characteristics
of the head of the household, including gender, age, marital status, and occupational dummy for industry of
employment. Lastly, exposure to other reforms, similar to the tari measure are constructed and included in the
set of controls.
6To estimate specication (1), data is pieced together from a variety of sources. Pre-reform
Employment was obtained from both the 43'rd Round of the National Sample Survey (NSSO)
and the 1991 Census; pre-reform population was obtained from the 1991 Census; and measures
of the reforms were gathered from a number of Indian government publications. Household
consumption and characteristics were obtained from the 43'rd and 55'th rounds of the NSSO
survey.
Section 3.2: Tari Liberalization and Food Security
Estimates of specication (1) are presented in Table 3. Consistent with both Topalova (2007)
and Edmonds et al (2009), households in regions more exposed to the tari reductions decreased
their expenditure on all goods and services. The average exposure to the tari reform over this
time period implies a 4.9 percent reduction in overall expenditure.
Table 3 also estimates specications where the dependent variable is disaggregated into each
individual component. The reduction in consumption is not uniform across all goods. Rather,
households do not decrease their consumption of cereals, but decrease their consumption of
every other food item aside from meat. This substitution away from more expensive calories
negatively impacts the diversity of the Indian diet, which already relies on cereals for nearly 70
percent of total calorie consumption (Tandon and Landes, forthcoming).
However, despite the decrease in overall consumption, calories consumed are less responsive
to the tari reform. Households more exposed to the tari reform do decrease the number of
calories consumed, but the data cannot reject the hypothesis that the number of food-insecure
households is uncorrelated with the exposure to the tari reform.
Section 4: Conclusions
This study used the regional exposure to the tari liberalization during the Indian structural
reforms to estimate how household food consumption responded to the negative income shocks.
Overall consumption did decrease, but this pattern was not uniform across dierent food groups.
Rather, in order to cope with the income shocks, households substituted away from more ex-
pensive calories while maintaining the consumption of cereals. This resulted in consuming fewer
calories, but did not signicantly aect the number of food-insecure households.
These patterns suggest that households eectively mitigated the income shock in terms of
7maintaining a minimum level of consumption. However, this consumption change suggests that
households sacriced diet diversity and made their diet more dependent on cereals. This pattern
illustrates an additional possible short to medium-run impact of trade reforms on food security.
However, this analysis cannot address the ecacy of the existing food assistance programs in
the country. Although the consumption surveys present detailed data regarding the amount of
food aid received, participation in the program pre and post-reform were certainly not random.
However, one possible reason as to why cereals consumption did not decrease in response to an
income shock might be the result of the presence of food assistance, which sells subsidized rice
and grains.
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1.   This table reports results from regressing the tariff changes aimed at specific industries on observable characteristics of 
individuals working in those industries.  The level of observation is the industry. 
2.  All specifications include 2-digit NIC fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by 2-digit NIC codes. 
3.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
 Table 2:  Correlations between Tariff and Other Reforms 
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1.   This table reports results from regressing the tariff changes in each industry during each of the four time periods on 
indicator variables describing whether the industry was the target of other reforms.  The level of observation is the industry 
during each of the four time periods. 
2.  All specifications include industry fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by industry 

































































Residual Expenditure  306.4
 
(275.4) 
Notes:  Each row represents a separate regression, with the dependent variable in column (1), and column (2) reports the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction between an indicator for the household belonging to a backward caste or scheduled tribe and the share of 
close elections lost by the BJP in a region.  All specifications have 82,513 observations.  Robust standard errors clustered at the region 
level are reported in the parentheses.  *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  All specifications include regional and time fixed effects, and control 


















1.  The figure graphs the average tariff rates of the actual tariff series (Tar) over this time period, as well as the average tariff 
rate of a hypothetical tariff series (Tar_Inst).   
2.  The hypothetical series (Tar_Inst) is constructed by taking the actual pre-reform tariff rates, and simply applying the 
downward moving peak tariff rate, and then applying the normalization of all tariff rates to one of five levels.  Specifically, 
this series is constructed to ignore tariff changes aimed at individual and specific groups of industries. 
 